

Cassies 2005 Cases

Brand: Juicy Fruit 2001-2004

Winner: Sustained Success—Silver

Client Credits: Wrigley Canada

Michael McKean, President
Richard Parkinson, Director of Marketing
Len Willschick, Manager Consumer & Market Intelligence

Agency Credits: BBDO Canada

John Whitham, Executive Vice President, Managing Director
Timothy Welsh, Vice President, Account Director
John Terry, Vice President, Associate Creative Director (AD)
James Ansley, Senior Copywriter

Crossover Notes: All winning cases contain lessons that cross over from one case to another. The notes for this case are as follows, and are attached. The full set can be downloaded from the Case Library section at www.cassies.ca

- Crossover Note 1. What a Brand Stands For.
- Crossover Note 2. Brand Truths.
- Crossover Note 6. Should the product be improved?
- Crossover Note 9. Turnarounds.
- Crossover Note 11. The Eureka Insight.
- Crossover Note 14. Refreshing a continuing campaign.
- Crossover Note 16. When a campaign stumbles.
- Crossover Note 17. Turning a liability into a strength.
- Crossover Note 28. Media Learning.
- Crossover Note 33. Changing the Target Audience.

To see creative, go to the Case Library Index and click on the additional links beside the case.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is a case about reinventing a small, staid, old brand while staying true to its DNA. It's about more than doubling share—from 4.3% to 10.8%. It's about creative success and huge financial return. **Crossover Note 9.**

This revitalization, from the product point of view, was founded on new line extensions. But they alone would not have solved Juicy Fruit's problem. A similar re-launch in the 90s, with significant media support, had failed. With this in mind, there were three critical decisions:

- To focus on teens, rather than Juicy Fruit's traditional 18 - 34 audience.
- To attack Juicy Fruit's previous heritage, by destroying (almost literally) its long-running jingle.
- To reject the classic high reach/frequency launch, and prioritize on continuity.

The plan broke with convention, and it won. This is how it all came together.

SITUATION ANALYSIS

Juicy Fruit left the 1990s a struggling brand. It failed to keep pace with sugar-free products promising breath freshening, intense mint flavours, a sexier new pellet format, and larger more intrusive packs. Two of these pellet brands, Excel and Dentyne Ice, had become market leaders, supported by new flavour introductions and heavy adspend. Both had seen tremendous growth: **Crossover Note 6.**

Chart 1 – Annual Market Share 1996-2000 (ACNielsen)

Brand	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	YTD thru Aug 2001
Juicy Fruit	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.8*	4.5	4.3
Excel	9.9	11.7	12.5	14.2	17.3	19.5
Dentyne Ice	3.6	6.7	10.2	11.0	14.3	17.7
Extra	17.3	15.9	14.6	14.4	13.6	12.5
Trident	23.6	24.4	25.5	25.1	20.5	18.4

YTD thru August 2001 is the period prior to the product launch of Juicy Fruit Original Pellet

*Juicy Fruit 1999 reflects the impact of Value Price Positioning.

Juicy Fruit was an old-fashioned sugar stick with a flavour that did not last. In 1992 it had launched a sugar-free tab (then the hot format) with TV support. In 1998, it had launched Value Price Proposition, focusing on its 35¢ price in a market of 79¢-89¢ products. Both initiatives led to short-term gain, before a return to the long-term downward trend.

By 2001, Juicy Fruit had a 4.3% share, well behind the leaders. The top four brands (Excel, Ice, Trident and Extra) averaged \$3.4 million in media spend. Juicy Fruit's proposed 2002 budget was \$940M. The gum market had evolved. Juicy Fruit hadn't.

STRATEGY & EXECUTION

Juicy Fruit's resurgence began in August 2001 with the first shipments of Juicy Fruit Original Sugar Free Pellets. They matched the sweet Juicy Fruit flavour as closely as possible. However, as with the 1992 tab launch, this change in format only brought Juicy Fruit to market parity. Also, advertising support would not begin until January 2002 due to budget constraints.

The first question was the target audience.

Traditionally, Juicy Fruit had tried to straddle teens and the older audience. But research showed that an astonishing 49% of Juicy Fruit users were over 35, while only 6% were teens. Juicy Fruit also had serious image problems. It was old, stagnant, and boring, and we had become irrelevant to teens. [Crossover Notes 1 and 16](#).

We decided to focus on them—smaller in numbers, but heavy chewers (index 229).

We also decided that if we alienated the older target by putting Juicy Fruit on the teen radar screen, so be it. Even if we lost half our share with the older group, this would be more than offset by the gains we expected from teens. [Crossover Note 33](#).

The next question was creative, and what to do about the Juicy fruit image.

Juicy Fruit's product DNA has always been its sweet fruity taste. But that wasn't news. [Crossover Note 2](#). We needed to connect with teens on an emotional level as well. Early in 2001, we ran a Brand Camp – a full day session with teens. Suddenly, we had the second piece of the puzzle, because “sweet” has a special meaning: [Crossover Note 11](#).

Sweeeet – the essence of the Juicy Fruit product – in teenspeak for cool.

This led to the creative strategy. “Sweeeet” moments that generate “sweeeet” reactions from sharing Juicy Fruit. We defined this as follows:

Sweeeet is not a word. It's an attitude. It's irreverent and it's fun. It's the way you see the world. To understand Sweeeet is to understand that life isn't to be taken too seriously. It's to understand that even life's darkest moments can turn into Sweeeet moments.

This alone, though, would not fix the image problem. Our advertising competed in the teen world of PowerAde, PS2, and Mountain Dew. Juicy Fruit needed to be cool and irreverent - the exact opposite of what it was. Drastic measures were needed.

This led to another key decision.

We would attack the old image by destroying (almost literally) the embodiment of the old Juicy Fruit brand – that oh-so-happy jingle. [Crossover Note 17](#).

In January 2002, we launched TV support for the *Original* line extension, with “New Beginning,” and an utterly new approach.

The spot opens with the classic Juicy Fruit scenario. Too-good-to-be-true skiers are having wholesome fun après-ski. David, our clean-cut hero, is singing the time-honoured Juicy Fruit jingle.

Suddenly, this idyllic moment is destroyed by our new, young, edgy target. Two hip snowboarders arrive. They smash David’s guitar, ruining the sing-a-long. They are also smashing the old Juicy Fruit, obliterating the old, stagnant image, and all that it stood for.



Juicy Fruit Red, the second Juicy Fruit line extension, launched on TV with “Sucka” in March 2003. “Sucka” incorporates all the successful elements of “New Beginning,” and this time David is sucked into a road-cleaning machine.

The third flavour, Juicy Fruit Blue, launched on TV in May 2004 with “Worldwide Guitar.” This maintains the “destroying” elements of earlier spots, and provides a fresh perspective to keep the teen audience interested.

The latest commercial, “Anger Management,” is a brand equity spot. It increases the prominence of the Juicy Fruit dudes, while maintaining the elements that have resonated so strongly with teens. **Crossover Note 14.**

HOW THE CREATIVE WORKED

It works on a number of levels. From our Brand Camp, and creative testing, we knew that ‘Sweet’ was a powerful idea. We also knew that our willingness to poke fun at ourselves signified confidence in the brand—and by talking to teens in their language we created an irreverent personality that connected with them.

When we attacked our heritage we knew we might alienate some users—and “New Beginning” got a Wrigley corporate record of 283 complaints. However, pre-testing showed that ‘likes’ significantly outweighed ‘dislikes,’ and we were getting through to teens.¹

Tracking results have been phenomenal—with some of the highest scores ever seen, not only at Wrigley Canada but also at DVR, the national research firm that handles all Wrigley Canada tracking.

We had put Juicy Fruit on the teen radar screen.

MEDIA

We had to establish our new positioning quickly, but continuity is also important in this impulse category. With teens, if you are not in their face you are out of their minds. Further, 84% of our target buys weekly, and Juicy Fruit is a change of pace from breath-freshening products. To capture these secondary chewing occasions, Juicy Fruit needed to be top of mind.

But our \$940,000 budget (less in absolute dollars than the failed launch of the sugar free tab in 1992) forced a stark strategic choice - the classic, new product launch of high reach and frequency, or continuity.

We selected continuity, accepting limited overall reach/frequency as the price. We depended on the “viral” nature of teens to spread the word to the missing reach points.

We created a non-traditional plan, based on the ideas of John Philip Jones & Erwin Ephron. It involved a cost-efficient 100% specialty TV buy, running from January 28 through May 12 2002. It had 75 weekly GRPs for 12 consecutive weeks, totaling 900 GRPs. Hardly your classic launch plan. **Crossover Note 28.**

Given the success in 2002, Juicy Fruit’s 2003 budget increased to \$3.0 million. We again focused on TV. We increased continuity on specialty TV to 22 weeks (1150 GRPs) and increased overall reach (95% vs. 70%) by adding 650 GRPs of conventional TV.

In 2004, with continued growth, the media budget grew to \$3.7 million. TV remained the focus as research showed there was still room to grow trial and awareness. We increased continuity on specialty (1390 GRPs over 32 weeks) and increased conventional spend to 925 GRPs over 13 weeks to support the launch of Juicy Fruit Blue.

¹ Editor’s Note. Later, we will see that Juicy Fruit still did well with its broader audience.

BUSINESS RESULTS

The results have been nothing short of outstanding—and more remarkable in the context of the retaliatory onslaught by competitors. Over the results period, there were 14 new product launches, six of which were fruit-based, and therefore aimed directly at the Juicy Fruit franchise.

a) 2002 Results – the Launch of Juicy Fruit Original

Juicy Fruit's 2002 share averaged 7.2, compared to the base year of 4.3. Reflecting the upward trend, the December 2002 share was 9.5.

Impressively 83% of the new share was incremental. Juicy Fruit Stick held its share at 3.7 points. Original Pellets added 3.5, while the tab product wound down

Chart 2 – 2002 Juicy Fruit (*Original*) Results

Juicy Fruit Annual Market Share - %		
	Base Year July 2000 – July 2001	Annual Average 2002
Total Juicy Fruit share (index)	4.3 (100)	7.2 (167)
Juicy Fruit Stick	3.7	3.7
Juicy Fruit Original Pellets	-	3.5
Juicy Fruit Tab	0.6	-

Source: ACNielsen

b) 2003 Results – the Red Launch

The pattern repeated itself with the launch of *Red*. 2003 share grew to an average 10.5%. By December 2003 the latest 4-week share had reached 11.3 points. *Red* achieved a 3.4 share, with virtually all of it (97%) net incremental.

Chart 3 – 2003 Juicy Fruit (*Red*) Results

Juicy Fruit Annual Market Share - %			
	Base Year July 00 – July 01	Annual Average 2002	Annual Average 2003
Total Juicy Fruit (index to base year)	4.3 (100)	7.2 (167)	10.5 (244)
Juicy Fruit Stick	3.7	3.7	3.1
Original Pellets	-	3.5	4.1
Juicy Fruit Red	-	-	3.4

Source: ACNielsen

c) 2004 Results – the Blue Launch

2004 saw a different pattern. With two consecutive years of success under our belts, we launched *Blue* creative only three weeks after *Blue* began shipping—much shorter than the Wrigley Canada norm of twelve weeks. *Blue* achieved a 3.0 share in its third month, compared to nine and seven months for *Original* and *Red* respectively.

However, Adams was not standing idly by. Perhaps in reaction to Juicy Fruit’s growth over the previous two years, Adams launched 14 new flavours during our results period, and six of them were fruit-based gums aimed directly at Juicy Fruit.

Even so, the franchise added another 0.3 share points in 2004, to an average of 10.8%.

Chart 4 – 2004 Juicy Fruit (*Blue*) Results

Juicy Fruit Annual Market Share - %				
	Base Year July 00–July 01	Annual Average 2002	Annual Average 2003	Annual Average 2004
Total Juicy Fruit (index to base)	4.3 (100)	7.2 (167)	10.5 (244)	10.8 (251)
Juicy Fruit Stick	3.7	3.7	3.1	2.2
Original Pellets	-	3.5	4.1	3.8
Juicy Fruit Red	-	-	3.4	2.8
Juicy Fruit Blue	-	-	-	2.0

Source: ACNielsen

d) Consumer Loyalty

The best measure of consumer loyalty is the conversion ratio of Chewed Most Often relative to Past 3 Months usage. This rose from 9% in 2002 to 37% at the end of 2004.

Chart 5 – Usage

Juicy Fruit Usage 13-24- % Chewing					
	Jan 02	May 02	Aug 02	Oct 03	Nov 04
Past 3 Months	23 (100)	40 (100)	38 (100)	46 (100)	51 (100)
Past 7 Days	7 (30)	15 (38)	19 (50)	26 (57)	30 (59)
Chew Most Often	2 (9)	7 (18)	8 (21)	15 (33)	19 (37)

Source: Wrigley Tracking

e) Performance vs. the United States

Although not an objective at the outset of the campaign, Juicy Fruit significantly outperformed its US counterpart for the first time. During the same period, the United States launched two pellets and spent an equivalent amount of money behind the brand.

Chart 6 – Juicy Fruit Share Performance – Canada vs. the United States

	2001	2004
Canadian Juicy Fruit share indexed to US Juicy Fruit share	102	189

Source: ACNielsen

f) Juicy Fruit Impact on Wrigley Corporate performance

Juicy Fruit's success also affected the entire Canadian market. Traditionally, Wrigley's had lagged Adams corporately by 5-6 share points. As can be seen for 2003 below, Wrigley's held overall market leadership for the first time its history.²

Chart 7 –Wrigley's Corporate Performance vs. Adams

	2001	2002	2003	2004
Adams Corporate share	49.9	47.9	48.0	51.5
Wrigley's Corporate share	44.8	46.5	48.1	46.0
Wrigley's share point diff.	(5.1)	(1.4)	+0.1	(5.5)
Wrigley's annual share point change vs. prior year	0.8	1.7	1.6	(2.1)
Juicy Fruit's share point change vs. prior year	0.2	2.6	3.4	0.3
Juicy Fruit's % of the total Wrigley gain	25%	153%	213%	NA

Source: ACNielsen

g) Financial Return

The financial return from the re-launches and the advertising has been exceptional. We have evaluated this two ways.

1. **Profit from Operations (PFO).** Before the relaunches, Juicy Fruit was losing money but it is now delivering significant profit on par with Excel. This takes into account all associated costs of running the business as a whole.
2. **The Return Attributable to Advertising.** This ROI is the marginal contribution based on incremental volume generated solely by the advertising relative to the costs for that advertising. [The methodology was supplied.]. On this basis, every dollar spent returned two dollars and thirty-six cents—an exceptionally good ROI of 136%.

² Note: Not surprisingly, with 14 new products, Adams regained overall share leadership in 2004.

CAUSE & EFFECT BETWEEN ADVERTISING AND RESULTS


In this case, there were a number of factors contributing to the huge success. The product was a winner, remaining true to the brand's DNA and garnering high repeat rates after trial. Packaging was new and impactful at shelf. Sales effort, distribution and in-store merchandising were strong. There were NBA sponsorships, promotional "sweet patrol" to sample, and other promotion activities. Further, display support in this category is a key success factor. However, there is compelling evidence that advertising has been the critical variable in generating results.

1. The Pattern of Share Gains Over Time.

Gains correlate very strongly with advertising flights. Juicy Fruit *Original* was launched without ad support. Share responded immediately to merchandizing/sales/promotional support, averaging 1.4% by October, but then flattening out. When "New Beginning" began in January 2002, share added another 1.5 points over the course of the media buy. The stick format also added 0.2 share points, proving that it was not just the new product driving the brand.

Chart 8 – Original Launch Share Growth Pattern


Juicy Fruit National All Channels Share Tracking



An even stronger pattern was seen with the *Red* launch. *Red* grew for two periods behind rapid distribution growth/promotion/sampling, and accounted for all of the Juicy Fruit franchise gains. *Red* share then leveled off for two periods just as *Original* had. Then, once the advertising began, *Red* grew an additional 1.5 points, driving *Original* along with it. Clearly the advertising was driving Juicy Fruit more than just the new SKU.

Chart 9– Red Launch Share Growth Pattern

Juicy Fruit Red National All Channels Share Tracking




Note the promotion spikes. They provide dramatic share lifts, but equally dramatic drops, borrowing future consumption, *while the advertising lifts are more sustained.*

The strength of the brand is shown at the end of the *Red* chart above. At the end of August 2003, Trident launched a line of five pellet products (and a sixth in November) including Citrus Fruit aimed directly at the Juicy Fruit franchise. Juicy Fruit suffered an immediate hit as Trident gained trial. However, Juicy Fruit rebounded and even increased share relative to the period before the Trident launch.

A distinct pattern was seen with the *Blue* launch. Due to previous successes, the product and advertising were launched within weeks, making it impossible to separate the gains attributable to distribution and advertising. *Blue* achieved a 3.0 share much faster than the previous two launches.

The chart also illustrates the Adams launches throughout 2004, including numerous fruit flavours that competed directly with Juicy Fruit. The brand maintained share remarkably well in the face of this competitive attack.

Chart 10 – Blue Launch Share Growth Pattern



Source: ACNielsen

2. Trade Support

We submit that trade support is not a strong variable. Although Co-op and Display support has grown, the pattern relative to share shows that it was not a determining variable. During the Original launch, there were significant trade support increases in the “distribution periods,” but a decrease during the advertising period (when share increased substantially). During the Red launch, display increased during distribution yet was flat during the advertising period—again when share accelerated strongly.

3. Marketing Mix Analysis

Wrigley Canada commissioned a Marketing Mix Analysis that encompassed the first two years of the “Sweet” campaign. The results prove that the Juicy Fruit TV campaign contributed the largest amount of incremental volume to the Wrigley portfolio—three times the contribution for market leader Excel. The following is MMA’s evaluation.

The brand experienced tremendous growth during this period and rightfully benefited from an increased media budget in 2003. This increase in spending was more than justified as the near 400% increase in television spend generated almost 1000% the volume as compared to 2002.

The impact of Juicy Fruit television advertising is also sustained as sales remain strong for 4.17 weeks after exposure as during the week of exposure compared to a consumer packaged goods norm of 3.0 weeks. The campaign also gained momentum over time, rather than exhibiting a ‘wear-out’ effect.

The strength of the campaign is further supported when competitive activity is analyzed. Although competitive television activity from Dentyne Ice and Trident negatively impacted Juicy Fruit, the incremental volume achieved by Juicy Fruit’s own television support far outweighed the total competitive impacts. Juicy Fruit TV-driven incremental volume increased 860% due to both significant increases in activity and advertising effectiveness.

4. Awareness.

Juicy Fruit’s unaided awareness scores (27) grew dramatically, surpassing Excel and Dentyne Ice (17 and 19 respectively) while being considerably outspent

Chart 11 – Juicy Fruit Awareness

Juicy Fruit Awareness 13-24					
	Jan 02	May 02	Aug 02	Oct 03	Nov 04
Unaided Ad Awareness	5	22	21	27	na*
Total Ad Awareness	31	54	52	54	na*
Top of Mind Brand	1	8	8	10	14
Share of Mind Brand	21	28	30	32	36

Source: Wrigley Tracking *Methodology changed in 2004, numbers no longer comparable

Chart 11a – Share of Voice

Share of Voice				
	2002	2003	2004	Average
Juicy Fruit	7.9% (100)	12.9% (100)	15.7% (100)	12.2% (100)
Excel	16.0% (202)	19.8% (154)	23.8% (152)	19.9% (163)
Dentyne Ice	19.3% (244)	21.4% (186)	18.4% (117)	19.7% (162)

Source: ACNielsen

5. Source of Volume.

Research shows that much of Juicy Fruit's success has come from teens, without alienating the 18-34 age group.

The risk we took in targeting only teens—only 6% of Juicy Fruit chewers prior to the campaign—has clearly paid off.

Chart 12 – Juicy Fruit – % user distribution by age by year

Age Group	3-11	12-17	18-34	35-49	50+
1999 – Pre	19	6	26	25	24
2004 – Post	19	19	27	21	14
Change	-	+13	+1	-4	-10

Source: Wrigley Research – Canadian Facts Study 2004

6. Brand Image

We have revitalized the Juicy Fruit brand. Juicy Fruit's ratings now rival Dentyne Ice and Trident on a number of key measures. We have taken Juicy Fruit from an old, boring brand to a fun, cool brand for teens. This transformation is entirely attributable to the advertising and our decision to focus on teens.

Chart 13 – Juicy Fruit Brand Imagery

	January 2002	October 2003
Has a new image	15	44
Is a brand for me	14	24

Source: Wrigley Tracking

Chart 13a – Juicy Fruit Brand Imagery

	Juicy Fruit	Dentyne Ice	Trident
Is a fun brand	7.0	6.2	5.7
I'd recommend to friends	6.7	6.5	6.0
Is a cool brand	6.8	6.5	6.1
Is for teens	6.5	6.3	5.1
Is a brand I can relate to	5.9	6.1	5.2

Source: Wrigley Tracking November 2004

End of Case. Crossover Notes follow.

INTRODUCTION TO CROSSOVER NOTES — CASSIES 2005

[For Juicy Fruit]

Crossover Notes have been going for several years, and now run to 28 pages.

We used to attach a full set to all cases, but to save a few trees, we now include only the Notes particular to any case.

The idea of Crossover Notes occurred to me while I was editing Cassies 1997.

I was a consultant by then. Before that I had reached the category manager level at P&G (what they quaintly called the Associate Advertising Manager). I had then clambered up the ladder at O&M, eventually becoming President and later Vice Chairman—both in Toronto. P&G and O&M were both passionate about “lessons learned,” and so was I. In those days (it seems hard to believe now) we felt rushed off our feet. But we did have time to study if campaigns were working or not, and come to conclusions about why.

There are lessons, like gold dust, in all the Cassies cases. So in 1997 I decided to extract them. This started with bite-sized footnotes about lessons that “cross over” from one case to another. And the idea kept growing. It is still anchored to winning cases, but I also draw on other thinking for more complex issues.

You can use Crossover Notes in two ways. Although they didn’t start out as a crash course in advertising, they are worth reading as a whole. You can also dip into them selectively. The headings on the next page will help you choose.

I’ve tried to be even-handed on controversial issues, but here and there you will sense my point of view. For this I thank the Cassies for not editing their Editor.

We now have over 150 published cases. They’re a growing body of experience. I hope I’ve helped pass some of the learning on.

David Rutherford

Toronto: December 2005.

For advice on brand-building see *Excellence in Brand Communication*—authored by leading Canadians from across the marketing and advertising spectrum.

It is published by the ICA. See www.ica.adbeast.com.

INDEX OF CROSSOVER NOTES FOR CASSIES 2005

All Cases	Juicy Fruit
1. What a Brand Stands For.	✓
2. Brand Truths.	✓
3. Core Equity versus Price & Promotion.	
4. Business Strategy dictated by the Brand Positioning.	
5. The Total Brand Experience.	
6. Should the product be improved?	✓
7. Fighting for the Same High Ground.	
8. Classic Rivalries.	
9. Turnarounds.	✓
10. Conventional Wisdom—should it be challenged?	
11. The Eureka Insight.	✓
12. Changing the Goalposts.	
13. Immediate vs. Long-Term Effect.	
14. Refreshing a continuing campaign.	✓
15. Baby with the Bathwater.	
16. When a campaign stumbles.	✓
17. Turning a liability into a strength.	✓
18. Keeping it Simple.	
19. Great minds think alike.	
20. Emotional versus Rational.	
21. Likeability.	
22. Humour in a Serious Category.	
23. Problem versus Solution.	
24. Tough Topics.	
25. Brand Linkage (when should the brand name appear).	
26. Awareness Alone.	
27. Share of Mind, Share of Voice, Spending.	
28. Media Learning.	✓
29. Pre-emptive Media.	
30. Reach and Frequency versus Large-Space Impact.	
31. Transcending Advertising.	
32. Internal Marketing.	
33. Changing the Target Audience.	✓
34. Longer and Broader Effects, and A Closing Thought .	

The Notes for this case are marked ✓ and come next.

JUICY FRUIT. CROSSOVER NOTES. CASSIES 2005.

- 1. What a Brand Stands For.** People in real life hardly give the deeper meaning of brands a second thought. They know that some appeal more than others. They may have a sense that brands jostle for their attention. But that's about it. They certainly don't agonize over what is the essence of this, or the abiding truth of that.

But branding goes deeper than we in marketing may realize. Before marketing was even thought of, branding was part of life. Everything from national flags, to coinage, to the uniforms on soldiers, boy scouts and Supreme Court judges, to the plumage on peacocks (human and otherwise), is a form of branding. Business had an early example in the 1800s when Harley Procter of P&G heard a pastor quote a biblical text about ivory palaces. Goodbye Procter & Gamble White Soap. Hello Ivory. More recently, Tom Peters published *A Brand Called You*. And Tony Blair tried to re-brand the UK as "Cool Britannia."

A brand, in the fullest sense, is hard to define. Dictionary definitions tend to focus on the trademark aspect, and yes, branding does involve some sort of identifying mark. But this misses the point. What makes a brand valuable?

The answer is *The Advantage of Belief*.³ Charles Revson of Revlon famously said, "In the factory we make cosmetics. In the store we sell hope." In other words, a brand is not a product; it's what people believe about a product. These beliefs can be immensely powerful. The most astonishing is the placebo effect. In clinical trials, many patients respond to the "sugar pill," even when they have serious diseases. We see the same thing with blind and identified product tests. With a strong brand, the preference jumps. (See *What's in a Name* by John Philip Jones.) And when the *Advantage of Belief* takes hold, it leads to a long list of benefits:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| a) Customer loyalty | e) Facilitating brand extensions |
| b) Higher price | f) Withstanding competitive attack |
| c) Higher cash flows | g) Motivating staff and attracting new talent |
| d) Higher long-term profitability | h) Potentially augmenting the stock price |

This doesn't, of course, answer the question, "how do you build these beliefs?" There are widely varying notions, but most agree on the basic principles: (1) stake out what the brand can and should stand for (2) stick with this over time (3) evolve to account for lessons learned and market changes.⁴

This can't be done by empty promises. We have to assess what consumers want against what the product delivers—and tell the story better than competitors do. We have a melting pot of perceptions and reality to work with. All the "brand" ideas are there to help—Brand Image, Equity, Personality, Character, Essence, Relationship, Footprint, Truth, Soul, Identity, and so on—along with old faithfuls like Positioning, Focus of Sale, USP, Features, Attributes, Benefits and Values. Whatever the terminology, though, "what the brand stands for" is critical.

³ This is a phrase of mine, though the idea that a brand is "more" has been described by many authors.

⁴ How do you do this, and evolve? See *Excellence in Brand Communication*: www.ica.adbeast.com

- 2. Brand Truths.** Successful advertising (in fact all successful communication) resonates with its audience. As a marketer, you may want people to believe that you have the best-tasting coffee, but simply saying, “I have the best-tasting coffee” will not usually get the resonance you need. One school of thought is to say the obvious as loudly and crassly as you can. We could call it the Bad Boy syndrome. Another has led to the idea of Brand Truths. These operate on a deeper level than simple claims. One of the top UK agencies described it as “we interrogate the product until it confesses its strength.”

I was once the Brand Manager on Tide, and when we were asked, “What does Tide stand for” we said, “Superior cleaning. Not whitening. Not Brightening. Not Fabric Care. Superior *cleaning*.”⁵

Superior cleaning was the religion on Tide, and Tide delivered, despite the cliché that all detergents are alike. But this was only a glimmer of the Brand Truth. If you “interrogated” Tide the most startling truth was the *intense belief* of Tide users. This came to life in the immensely successful “Two for One Swap” campaign. Hidden cameras watched as women who had just bought Tide were offered two boxes of another detergent in exchange. They adamantly refused, delivering off-the-cuff endorsements that no copywriter could ever have come up with. The campaign ran for years, and only came to an end because of its success—women knew it so well that the “candid camera” interview became impossible. Many Brand Truths are also insights, and for a list see [11. The Eureka Insight](#) and [12. Changing the Goalposts](#).

- 6. Should the product be improved?** Some years ago it was an axiom that your product, functionally, had to have an advantage over competitors. In packaged goods, it was considered foolish to launch a new brand unless it was a blind test winner over its major competitor—ideally overall, and at least for a desirable benefit.⁶

That thinking has shifted, and it’s commonly said today that it’s impossible to sustain a functional advantage; that competition can match you in a matter of weeks or months, or even days with some technological products. This has had a paradoxical effect. Some people are almost frenzied in their desire to keep their product (or service) improving—fearing that if they don’t, they will be left behind. Others go into a slipstream mode—letting others face the headwinds, then matching what they do.

John Philip Jones (the Professor of Communication at Syracuse University) is vocal on this, saying that we do *not* live in a parity world—that imitators may try to match the innovators, but they often don’t quite succeed. His view (and I share it) is that it is dangerously complacent to assume that functional parity is the way of the world.

Another danger is the belief that “marketing” can compensate for a weak product. This led to the debacle a decade or two ago when North America systematically under-invested in product. The Japanese, and later the Europeans and others, did exactly the opposite—and carved out the market shares we see today.

⁵ P&G defined “what the brand stands for” by a document they called The Creative Strategy. In those days, if anyone even dreamt that the Tide Creative Strategy should include whitening, brightening etc. it was seen as an offence against all that was holy.

⁶ There was still the “pre-emptive” possibility i.e. staking out a convincing claim for a parity benefit before anyone else did. But, in general, having a product edge was seen as important

There's no question that the cost to upgrade can be daunting. Nevertheless, many cases reflect the investment. For example:

- Listerine in Quebec in Cassies II, with an improved taste.
- Chrysler in Cassies III, with the NS Minivan.
- Pontiac Sunfire in Cassies III.
- St Hubert in Cassies 99, upgrading their entire operation.
- Sunlight in Cassies 99, with improved cleaning.
- Home Furnace in Cassies 2002.
- Lipton Sidekicks in Cassies 2002.
- Irving Mainway Coffee and Source Yogurt in Cassies 2003.
- MINI in Cassies 2003.
- Motrin in Cassies 2003, adding stronger skus.
- VodKice in Cassies 2003, remodelling the Boomerang portfolio.
- Cirque du Soleil in Cassies 2004, by adding Zumanity to their portfolio.
- Kit Kat in Cassies 2004, keeping Original the same, but launching Chunky.
- Toyota Sienna in Cassies 2004, with multiple upgrades.
- Coricidin II in Cassies 2005 (Re-launching a new version, after the original brand had been withdrawn)
- Penaten, Hubba Bubba, Stouffer's Bistro, and Juicy Fruit, all launching line extensions in Cassies 2005.

Still others achieve their gains with no change—though the existing product is in all cases good, and sometimes better than the competition. These cases include:

- Crispy Crunch and Pepsi Quebec in Cassies I.
- Oh Henry! in Cassies II.
- Buckley's, Dove, and Philadelphia Cream Cheese in Cassies III.
- Eggs, becel, and Wonderbread in Cassies 99.
- Kraft Dinner and Lipton Chicken Noodle in Cassies 2001.
- Campbell's, Diet Pepsi, Listerine, and Pro•Line in Cassies 2002.
- All the major beer winners over the years.
- Aero, Dodge SX 2.0, Familiprix, Super 7, in Cassies 2003.
- Cottonelle and Milk in Cassies 2004.
- Crescendo, Jergens Ultra Care, Whiskas, Twix, Energizer Lithium, Moores, Familiprix in Cassies 2005.

Technology cases usually have improvements. Services (e.g. Desjardins, Gaz Metro, Réno Dépôt in 2004) usually improve as part of the "total brand experience." Some cases (e.g. Clearnet in 2001 and Lipton Sidekicks in Cassies 2002) say that if your functional advantage is going to be matched, you'd better develop an advantage through brand personality/character/equity. There is no cookie-cutter answer. Each situation has to be assessed on its merits.

9. Turnarounds. There are a number of these in the Cassies:

Cassies I

- Crispy Crunch. Molson Canadian.
- Pepsi. Quebec.

Cassies II

- Listerine. Quebec.
- Oh Hungry? Oh Henry.

Cassies II

- Dove. "Litmus."
- Molson Canadian. "I AM."
- Philadelphia Cream Cheese.

Cassies 99

- becel. "Young at Heart"
- Eggs. Wonder Bread
- Sunlight. "Go Ahead. Get Dirty."

Cassies 2001

- Kraft Dinner.
- Lipton Chicken Noodle.

Cassies 2002

- BMO Quebec.
- Campbell's Soup. Listerine.
- CFL. Pro•Line.
- Easter Seals Relay.
- Sleeman Quebec.

Cassies 2003

- Aero. Bait Cars.
- Crown Diamond Paint.
- Dodge SX 2.0.
- Motrin.
- Pro•Line. Super 7.
- Université de Montréal.
- VodKice.

Cassies 2004

- Cottonelle.
- Gaz Metro.
- Kit Kat.
- Milk (Quebec and Prairies).
- Toyota Sienna.

Cassies 2005

- Crescendo.
- Energizer Lithium.
- Toyota Tacoma.
- Eggo French Toast Stix.
- Twix. Hubba Bubba. Juicy Fruit.
- Coricidin II.
- Moores and Harvey's.
- Quebec Lotto 6/49.
- Pepsi – Quebec and Quebec Milk.

11. The Eureka Insight. These feature in many cases. Some examples:

- Oh Henry! None of the gut-fillers had tried to own hunger, even though it was the high ground for the category. Cassies II. See also *Crossover Note 7*.
- Buckley's. Rather than side-step their bad taste, Buckley's relished it. Cassies III.
- Chrysler. Minivans were "my most expensive household appliance." Even so, *emotion* was the key to an immensely successful launch. Cassies III.
- Philadelphia Cream Cheese. In research, people often do not own up to what they really want, which in this case was "permission to indulge." Cassies III.
- Richmond Savings. Almost everyone hated banks, but it still took insight to turn this into the "Humungous Bank." Cassies III.
- Eggs are natural, but in word-association tests, consumers did not say so. (See *12. Changing the Goalposts*.) The farmer campaign brought "natural" to life.
- Sunlight. Getting dirty is fun. This is diametrically opposed to the conventional wisdom, dominated by Tide, that clean is good and dirt is bad. Cassies 99.
- Fido in Cassies 99. In an echo of Apple vs. IBM, Fido saw that consumers needed the human touch. See also Clearnet and "the future is friendly" in Cassies 2001.
- Diet Pepsi in Cassies 2002. They found a way to be youthful without being too young in the "forever young" campaign.
- Listerine in Cassies 2002: healthy gums, after a century talking about bad breath.
- Pro•Line in Cassies 2002: Appealed to non-experts with "Anyone can win."
- Aero. Saw the power of "melting" in Cassies 2003.

- Crown Diamond. Used the fact that men hate to paint in Cassies 2003.
- Super 7. Ignored the political correctness of being tasteful. Cassies 2003.
- Cottonelle. Talked to women as women, not as “family.” Cassies 2004.
- Toyota Sienna. Realized that the answer lay not in what SUV buyers do. Cassies 2004.
- Irving’s Cruisin’ to Win. Saw the power of *small* prizes. Cassies 2005.
- Crescendo. Like Oh Henry! saw unoccupied high ground. Cassies 2005.
- Butter. Saw a way to use “natural” to connote taste and health. Cassies 2005.
- Anti-Smoking. Saw the power of “Stupid.” Cassies 2005.
- Jergens Ultra Care. Saw a way to reposition skin. Cassies 2005.
- Whiskas saw things from the *cat’s* point of view. Cassies 2005.
- Moores used the fact that their target audience hates shopping. Cassies 2005.
- Harvey’s realized the significance of The Grill. Cassies 2005.
- Quebec Lotto 6/49. If 6/49 winners are so generous, be nice to them. Cassies 2005.
- United Way saw power in the Hand icon. Cassies 2005.
- Leucan realized that there is still hope, despite childhood cancer. Cassies 2005.
- CIBC Run for the Cure saw the power in the Pinnie idea. Cassies 2005.
- Juicy Fruit saw how to build a new image by destroying the old one. Cassies 2005.
- Quebec Milk saw the obvious—if one glass is good, two are better. Cassies 2005.
- Plus virtually all the cases in *Crossover Note 10*.

14. Refreshing a continuing campaign. When I was at P&G and O&M, all the big advertisers and their agencies thought in terms of campaigns. If you presented new advertising, and got the comment “that’s just a one-off,” it was the kiss of death. In those days, a campaign was usually defined by television. There would be one commercial, or a pool, refreshed over time. Nowadays, a campaign is more complicated. But it’s fair to say that we (clients and agencies) still believe that campaigns are the right/best way to build a brand.⁷

Recently, the idea of “the brand relationship” has taken hold. This is the notion that we treat brands like friends. Brand Truths can come out of this type of thinking, as can other insights.

Relationships can be very different, but for most people, the good ones are based on things like trust and consistency, though not dullness and predictability. This has led to the idea that brands should present a consistent face over time (assuming, of course, that they are standing for the right thing.)

There is still the question, though, of what is a campaign? At one time, packaged goods advertisers (and some agencies) believed in strict pool-outs. But campaigns don’t have to be so formatted. The following list doesn’t pretend to be exhaustive (some campaigns don’t lend themselves to being categorized) but it starts at rigid end of the spectrum, and extends to the holistic.

⁷ A young creative friend said to me, “where does the belief in campaigns come from? Young people want constant change. What’s wrong with a stream of one-off ideas?” This would have been heresy at one time, and perhaps still is. But it’s food for thought.

All versions have their successes and failures, and I hope this will help free up some of the rigid thinking:

- **Strict Pool-Out.** Campaigns like "Who wants Gum? I do. I do." There is a repeated format, often with a USP demo or slogan. Some people think this type of advertising is passé. Others remember it fondly.
- **Hall of Fame Pool-Out.** Some think pool outs are dull, predictable and clichéd. Not necessarily. The 20-odd year campaign for Hamlet cigars in the UK is rigidly formatted, but spectacularly creative and effective. Familiprix is the same.
- **Situational Pool-Out.** These don't have the format of the strict pool out but still have a clear connection between executions. Diet Pepsi's "Forever Young" and Pro-Line's "Anyone can Win" are examples. Huggies "Happy Baby" is one of the longest-running. Clearnet/Telus is in this camp too.

This category also includes spectacular executions like "Manhattan Landing" and "Face" for British Airways, though it can be hard to keep coming up with ideas this big. Kit Kat is a different type of example, where the "break" continues, and the challenge is to keep it up to date.

- **Icons.** These can anchor a campaign (Maytag Man, Marlboro Cowboy) or be a property (Tony the Tiger, Pillsbury Doughboy). Some see icons as a yesterday idea, but I think that's a mis-call. Absolut Vodka uses its bottle as an icon, and it's brilliant. The Familiprix pharmacist is hilariously effective.
- **Spokes-people, and Spokes-animals.** Dave Thomas and Colonel Sanders, god rest their souls, are examples, as is Morty the Bison for Manitoba Telecom.
- **Storytelling with continuing character(s).** The Oxo family in the UK is a long-running examples. Bartles and Jaymes was a wonderful success story in the US. Personalities have been very successful in Quebec e.g. the Pepsi and Listerine Grand Prix winners in Cassies I and II.
- **Music-Based.** Music sometimes goes beyond a supporting role, and becomes part of the brand character. Soft Drinks, Cars, Fast Food, and Beer have all built campaigns this way. In packaged goods, becel's "young at heart" campaign would be an example.
- **Consistent "Voice and Attitude."** These campaigns are held together by something more subtle. Perhaps the most impressive was Volkswagen in the 60s. Individual executions were different (serious, comical, ironic, dramatic) but they all had the Volkswagen voice and attitude. Brands like Nike are in this category. Benneton is an extreme example.
- **Same core message. Customized execution.** To people with a strict "pool-out" mindset, this hardly qualifies at all. But the overall effect can be very powerful. The best Cassies example is the 4-year Dove Case from Cassies III.⁸

The campaign started in late 91 with "Litmus," a strikingly simple demonstration, with no people or voice over—just haunting music, and some supers.

⁸ Another example is Budweiser in Quebec. Its 10-year campaign has always been centred on rock 'n roll, but it has always evolved.

Then came a raucous candid-camera commercial of focus group women doing the litmus test for themselves. Then a talking-head scientist who invented Dove. Then another demonstration—similar to “Litmus,” with the haunting music again.

The first three executions are so different that some people would not have approved them. Given the subsequent results, that would have been a pity. What holds it all together? The continuing promise of mildness. A scrupulously honest and consistent brand character. And an element of surprise in each execution. Note, though, that there are no continuing slogans or visual icons.

More generally, It’s an open question whether today’s obsessively short-term attitude is causing us to lose the drive we once had for great campaigns. I hope it isn’t.

16. When a campaign stumbles. This might be a momentary stutter and (if we were clairvoyant) we would know what was needed to make a minor fix. But it might be the first clue that something is going off the rails. In this situation, the pressure can lead to snap (and wrong) judgments. The best answer usually comes from a blend of experience, judgment, intuition, vision, and research. Here are some pointers.

1. **Dig deep into trends and tastes.** You could be on the wrong side of a tectonic shift. They can be massive. “Made in Japan” used to mean a cheap, shlocky, knock-off, and North American business took years to see what was coming. Crossover Note 6. Consider Listerine. “Always a bridesmaid, but never a bride” started life in a Listerine advertisement, reflecting a bad breath positioning that had been in place for as long as anyone can remember. But a shift was happening, towards the idea of a healthy mouth. (See Cassies 1995 and 2002). Something similar has happened in toothpaste. At one time, Pepsodent (“you’ll wonder where the yellow went...”) was the leader, and whitening was the high ground. Crest came along with fluoride (and dental association endorsement).

This transformed the market, and Pepsodent slid into history. Over the next generation, though, cavities stopped being the problem they once were.⁹ The market started to shift towards “mouth health” and Colgate got there first with Colgate Total, knocking Crest off its #1 perch. Crest responded with Crest Complete—and now the whole market has come full circle with a furious battle for whitening again.

2. **Look at the goalposts.** If they really haven’t changed, then it’s likely that you just have a short-term stutter. But if they have, try to envisage the new game. See *11. The Eureka Insight*, and *12. Changing the Goalposts*.
3. **Think through the change needed.** See *6. Should the product be improved?* and *14. Refreshing a Continuing Campaign*.
4. **Change for the right reasons.** It’s broadly true that long-running campaigns—kept fresh and relevant—are great brand-builders. And it’s sadly true that new

⁹ Ironically, Crest had helped make this happen, by driving the whole market in this direction.

people, wanting to make their mark, change things for change's sake. But once in a while, wholesale change is right.

Molson Canadian (Cassies I) was a niche player when it launched “What Beer’s all About” in the late 80s. Canadian became mainstream, and displaced Labatt Blue as market leader. You’d think they’d keep going with “What Beer’s all About.” And they did for a few years. But tastes were shifting. To stay ahead of this, they launched “I AM” in the mid 90s (Cassies III). This was successful, but eventually it too ran out of steam. Canadian then re-incarnated again with “Joe’s Rant.” (Cassies 2001.) This Juicy Fruit case— though this time the need for change is very much more obvious—would be another example.

17. Turning a liability into a strength. Some examples:

- Buckley’s—Tastes awful but it works. Cassies III.
- Irving Home Furnaces—Made a virtue of age. Cassies 2002.
- Listerine—Was seen as “Margaret Thatcher” and displaced this image with the Action Hero campaign. Cassies 2002.
- Pine-Sol—Far too strong. Softened this with “thorough clean.” Cassies 2002.
- Sleeman in Quebec—Re-vitalized with “honest frenglish.” Cassies 2002.
- Pro•Line—with “anyone can win.” Cassies 2002 and 2003.
- Crown Diamond—Appealed to men who hate painting. Cassies 2003.
- Super 7—Made a virtue of excess. Cassies 2003.
- Cirque du Soleil—showed eroticism without really showing it. Cassies 2004
- Gaz Metro—Made the (feared) gas flame the hero. Cassies 2004.
- Short Film Festival—Made a virtue of brevity. Cassies 2004.
- Irving’s Cruising to Win—Made a virtue of *small* prizes. Cassies 2005.
- Moores—Found a way to appeal to men who hate shopping. Cassies 2005.
- Juicy Fruit—Destroyed the oh-so-sweet Juicy Fruit jingle. Cassies 2005.
- Johnson’s Baby Shampoo—Used mildness to reposition against adults who wash their hair every day, and took over as market leader, despite being a blind test loser to adult shampoos.
- Heinz ketchup—Made a virtue of s-l-o-w.

28. Media Learning. Many years ago, studies (mainly in packaged goods) led to the idea of “effective frequency.” It was based on two broad notions:

- a) That advertising (assuming the creative was effective) had its best effect after 2-3 exposures in a purchase cycle.
- b) That exposure beyond this led to diminishing returns.

This matched learning theory i.e. that it takes repetition before a message sticks, but then boredom sets in, and repetition does not increase the learning much, if at all.¹⁰ This thinking has dominated media planning (particularly in TV) for years, and I think I’m right in saying that many planners embrace it today, not necessarily knowing its origins. It has gone by names such as effective frequency and 3+ planning. The idea is to try to give the audience 2-3 exposures in a purchase cycle, without wasting excessive frequency on them.¹¹

¹⁰ There are even findings that continued exposure *depresses* learning, though I find that hard to believe. P&G built very strong brands on its soap operas, and those daytime viewers saw the same ads repeatedly.

¹¹ It has traditionally been hard to avoid the excess frequency, especially with heavy TV viewers.

Other models also exist. There are “pulsing” models. There’s an “impact” model for making a big splash. And there are markets like beer, with heavy seasonal spending, with their own notions about the best way to schedule effort.

In the mid 90s, John Philip Jones—formerly of JWT UK/Europe and for some time Professor of Communications at Syracuse University—published a study that seemed to say that *just one* TV exposure (in the week before purchase) was enough. See [13. Immediate vs. Long-Term Effect](#).

This put the cat among the pigeons. Some have embraced the thinking. Some have attacked it. Jones’s findings were in harmony with those of Erwin Ephron (see the Pepsi paper in 2002) and the whole field has come to be called Recency Planning.

It proposes lower weekly weights than have historically been recommended, with longer weekly duration. TV Programmes are also selected to avoid loading up frequency on the same shows. This is drip-drip rather than impact, and it flies in the face of some long-held beliefs.

It seems to have worked for Pepsi, but detractors say that it has its failures too. For more on this still controversial topic, the WARC website is invaluable—with papers by Jones, Lodish, and McDonald being a good place to start.

33. Changing the Target Audience. The most famous example is Marlboro, originally positioned against women, with red filter tip so that lipstick didn’t show. The Leo Burnett people changed all that with the Marlboro cowboy. This looks easy with hindsight, but when the decision has to be made it can be tough. There’s usually a fair amount of angst about losing current users, leading to the sort of creative brief that says “appeal to X without alienating Y.”

I recall two spectacular IPA examples that were prepared to alienate previous users: Batchelor’s SuperNoodles and Peperami (chewy, sausagey sticks) Advertising had been aimed at Moms for years. They decided to go after young men. Batchelors came up with “men behaving badly” ads. Peperami had a riotously sadistic cartoon campaign. This was anything but “Mom” advertising, but both businesses took off. That’s not to say we should always crash around in the china shop, alienating longstanding audiences. But there may be less risk than we think.

Cassies winners who risked alienation include CFL and 5 Alive in 2002, Family Channel in 2004, Crescendo, Eggo, Moores, Harvey’s, Juicy Fruit in 2005.

End of Juicy Fruit Crossover Notes.