

# Cassies 2007 Cases

**Brand/Case: Gay Lea Spreadables Butter**

**Winner: Off to a Good Start—Silver**

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**Crossover Notes:** All winning cases contain lessons that cross over from one case to another. David Rutherford has been identifying these as Crossover Notes since Cassies 1997. The full set for Cassies 2007 can be downloaded from the Case Library section at [www.cassies.ca](http://www.cassies.ca)

- Crossover Note 1.** What a Brand Stands For.
- Crossover Note 2.** Brand Truths.
- Crossover Note 16.** When a campaign stumbles.
- Crossover Note 23.** Problem versus Solution.
- Crossover Note 28.** Media Learning.

To see creative, go to the Case Library Index and click on the additional links beside the case.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Business Results Period (Consecutive Months):** January 2007 – June 2007  
**Start of Advertising/Communication Effort:** January 2007  
**Base Period for Comparison:** January 2006 – December 2006

Gay Lea Foods had introduced Spreadables Butter to Ontario in 2005 to grow the business and increase profitability. However, this had not been especially successful.

This case describes how the brand was revitalized in Ontario, and successfully launched out West. This was in the face of a great many hurdles, as explained below.

The results were strong and highly correlate with the timing of the campaign. In Ontario, Jan – June 2007 dollar volume more than doubled versus year ago. Similarly, the Western region is off to a strong start.

## SITUATION ANALYSIS

### a) Overall Assessment

Gay Lea Foods, like many businesses, needs to bring new products to market. Spreadables Butter (butter mixed with canola oil) was developed to deliver on that, by growing the business and increasing profitability. It was a popular and well known product throughout Europe, but it was entirely unfamiliar to the Canadian marketplace.

Spreadables launched in Ontario in 2005 with limited success. **Crossover Note 16.** During 2006 the only major support was an eight-week Brand Power campaign in the spring. Although there was a lift in sales while this was on air, growth was not sustained, likely due to the limited awareness generated (4% unaided awareness and 12% prompted recall).

Gay Lea Foods also wanted to evolve the business beyond Ontario, so the 2007 effort had to revitalize Ontario and launch it in Western Canada – where the Gay Lea brand had never existed before.

This would have to take place in an unfavourable competitive climate. Health trends continued to erode the butter category, with the Canada Food Guide recommending consumers limit their intake, while endorsing low-saturated fat margarines. Incidence of obesity and diabetes continued to see dramatic increases in Canada, putting pressure on consumers and manufacturers to limit or remove trans and saturated fats. Finally Becel had put butter in its crosshairs. Accounting for over 25% of butter and margarine, and growing 21.7% over the preceding four years, Becel dominated the category. With advertising that claimed “Becel has 80% less saturated fat than butter and unlike butter, no trans fat” Becel was focusing its resources on switching butter users and stealing butter occasions.

Added to all this Gay Lea Spreadables was almost triple the cost of Becel, almost double the cost of control label butter, and at a premium to Gay Lea’s base butter product.

## b) Resulting Business Objectives

- In Ontario - re-invigorate growth, and launch a Light SKU, without cannibalizing Gay Lea's base butter sales, and without price discounting.
- In the West - successfully launch the brand with two product SKUs.

## c) Budget Range/Share of Voice

\$1.1M for media and \$100K for production. (Media spend information was not purchased, but competitive activity by other butter manufacturers was noted before and/or during the campaign, and Becel continued its year-round television, extensive print, and widespread event and sponsorship support.

## STRATEGY & INSIGHT

### a) Analysis and Insight:

With household penetrations of 71% and 82% respectively, most homes use both butter and margarine. Margarine occasions were motivated by three reasons: 1) convenience – the tub and spreadability. 2) health – lower saturated and trans fats and an overall healthier perception than butter. 3) price.

When it came to butter, consumers widely agreed that its taste was superior and that a shift to margarine was a compromise. But that was only part of the puzzle. Recent health trends had also started a shift in attitudes towards more natural, less processed foods. Spreadables had three natural ingredients, so it was about as natural as any product available—and this was in stark contrast to margarines with their long list of unpronounceable ingredients. **Crossover Note 2.** By leveraging taste, naturalness, and the new spreadability and convenience, it appeared there was an opportunity to shift behaviour and occasions. **Crossover Note 1.**

### b) Business Strategy

To grow Spreadables while not cannibalizing the base butter product we had to steal occasions from margarine. However, consumers who used margarine because of saturated or trans fat, or who simply could not afford butter, would not be the focus.

It would be joint users of butter and margarine—those who were using margarine for its convenience (spreadability) and/or its perceived health benefits.

### c) Communication Strategy:

We would call in question the need for margarine now that spreadable butter is available. Consumers would understand that they don't need to compromise butter's superior taste, and they would get permission to come back because of butter's naturalness (and conversely margarine's less-than-natural composition). **Crossover Note 23.**

Furthermore, we would focus each execution on a single point of communication for clarity, and would deliver all the messages through multiple contacts with our consumer.

## CREATIVE EXECUTION


With a limited media budget, creative and the media had to work together to make the campaign feel greater than the budget would seem to allow. We ran in magazine, newspaper, transit, outdoor and online, with creative based on four principles:

- A simple, straightforward idea that would allow for small space executions (increasing the reach and frequency)
- Surprise and humor to make the ads enjoyable and unignorable
- Specific executions in specific media for greater relevance
- Executions in places the target may not expect to see an ad for butter

Examples, including their placement, follow:



Outdoor



**Margarine was invented in 1869 as a cheap butter substitute for French soldiers.**  
Yup, you've been feeding your kids 130 year old army rations.

BUTTER THAT SPREADS.



Transit

**Some people still use margarine.  
Some people still use blue eyeliner.**

BUTTER THAT SPREADS.



**Grilled cheese rejoice.**

BUTTER THAT SPREADS.




Fashion Magazines


Food/Cooking Magazines

**There's a reason nobody asks  
for margarine on their popcorn.**


BUTTER THAT SPREADS.



Theatre Advertising



Newspaper – Horoscopes



Newspaper – Crosswords



Online

## MEDIA EXECUTION

As mentioned above media and creative had to work hand-in-hand for greater relevance and impact. The small space ads also allowed for multiple executions, often within a single publication, significantly extending reach & frequency. **Crossover Note 28**. And we also included such media as gas pumps and washrooms to add surprise and standout.

The campaign launched in early January, 2007 with four weeks of outdoor and 2 weeks of online and transit. From February until early May magazine and online maintained presence as long as the budget would allow.

## BUSINESS RESULTS

In Ontario, dollar volume for Jan – June 2007 is indexing at 212 versus Jan-June 2006. Dollar share has risen a full share point in from 0.8% to 1.8%.

In the Western Region, starting from a zero base and with no brand equity, a \$400k media investment has generated a share of 0.6% and steadily increasing dollar volumes.



Impressively, these gains have not been at the expense of Gay Lea's base butter brand, but may have in fact assisted in its growth. The dollar volume versus year ago is up almost 16% and share is a full 1.5 points higher.

## CAUSE & EFFECT BETWEEN ADVERTISING AND RESULTS

No brand tracking has been done to date on the 2007 campaign, however, there have been no major changes in the retail activities during 2007 versus those of 2006, nor has there be any significantly change in distribution levels.

Previous marketing activities (including the Ontario launch in 2005 and the Brand Power effort in spring 2006) did not generate the dollar volumes and share increases seen wit the new campaign. Most importantly, the sales results highly correlate with the launch of the campaign and it appears the campaign is having a lasting impact.

A final (if back-handed) endorsement comes from the reaction of Becel. With obvious concern for the effect of the Spreadables campaign they have tried to have it pulled from the marketplace.

## INTRODUCTION TO CROSSOVER NOTES — CASSIES 2007

[For Gay Lea]

Each year I update these Crossover Notes. If you've read this cover note before, you can skip it. If not, it's worth a quick read.

My career started with a seven year sentence in brand management at Procter & Gamble. Then I clambered up the ladder at O&M, becoming President and later Vice Chairman, all of this in Toronto. Then I set up as a consultant.

P&G and O&M were passionate about "lessons learned" from advertising effort, and so was I. All the Cassies cases have great lessons in them, though at the pace we work today these lessons are not necessarily easy to find.

I was thinking about this as I was editing Cassies 1997, and I had the idea for Crossover Notes. They started as bite-sized footnotes pointing out lessons that "cross over" from one case to another. Then, as time had gone by, they've evolved to what we have today.

You can use Crossover Notes in two ways. Although they weren't designed as a crash course in advertising, they are worth reading as a whole. You can also dip into them selectively. The headings on the next page will help you choose.

I've tried to be even-handed on controversial issues, but here and there you will sense my point of view. For this I thank the Cassies for not editing their Editor.

We now have close to 200 published cases. And I hope I've helped pass some of the learning on.

*David Rutherford*

Toronto: January 2008.

For more on brand-building see *Excellence in Brand Communication*—by leading Canadians from across the marketing and advertising spectrum. See also *Vulcans. Earthlings and Marketing ROI*, commissioned by the ICA, and published by Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

See [www.ica.adbeast.com](http://www.ica.adbeast.com).

## INDEX OF CROSSOVER NOTES FOR CASSIES 2007

| <b>All Cases</b>  | <b>Gay Lea</b> |
|---|----------------|
| 1. What a Brand Stands For.                                   | ✓              |
| 2. Brand Truths.  | ✓              |
| 3. Core Equity versus Price & Promotion.                      |                |
| 4. Business Strategy dictated by the Brand Positioning.       |                |
| 5. The Total Brand Experience.                                |                |
| 6. Should the product be improved?                            |                |
| 7. Fighting for the Same High Ground.                         |                |
| 8. Classic Rivalries.   |                |
| 9. Turnarounds.   |                |
| 10. Conventional Wisdom—should it be challenged?              |                |
| 11. The Eureka Insight.                                       |                |
| 12. Changing the Goalposts.                                   |                |
| 13. Immediate vs. Long-Term Effect.                           |                |
| 14. Refreshing a continuing campaign.                         |                |
| 15. Baby with the Bathwater.                                  |                |
| 16. When a campaign stumbles.                                 | ✓              |
| 17. Turning a liability into a strength.                      |                |
| 18. Keeping it Simple.  |                |
| 19. Great minds think alike.                                  |                |
| 20. Emotional versus Rational.                                |                |
| 21. Likeability.  |                |
| 22. Humour in a Serious Category.                             |                |
| 23. Problem versus Solution.                                  | ✓              |
| 24. Tough Topics.   |                |
| 25. Brand Linkage (when should the brand name appear).        |                |
| 26. Awareness Alone.  |                |
| 27. Share of Mind, Share of Voice, Spending.                  |                |
| 28. Media Learning.   | ✓              |
| 29. Pre-emptive Media.  |                |
| 30. Reach and Frequency versus Large-Space Impact.            |                |
| 31. Transcending Advertising.                                 |                |
| 32. Internal Marketing.                                       |                |
| 33. Changing the Target Audience.                             |                |
| 34. Longer and Broader Effects, and <b>A Closing Thought.</b> |                |

The Notes for this case are marked ✓ and come next.

Note: Cassies uses “advertising” in its broad sense. It not only stands for advertising through the main media of broadcast, print, out of home etc. Where appropriate, it also stands for Direct Marketing, PR, Interactive Marketing, Buzz Marketing, Event Marketing, Product Placement etc.

## GAY LEA CROSSOVER NOTES FOR CASSIES 2007

1. **What a Brand Stands For.** People in real life hardly give the deeper meaning of brands a second thought. They know that some appeal more than others. They may have a sense that brands jostle for their attention. But that's about it. They certainly don't agonize over the *essence* of this, or the *brand truth* of that.

That said, branding goes deeper than we in marketing may realize. Before marketing was even thought of, branding was part of life. Everything from national flags, to coinage, to the uniforms of soldiers, boy scouts and Supreme Court judges, to the plumage on peacocks (human and otherwise), is a form of branding. Business had an early example in the 1800s when Harley Procter of P&G heard a pastor quote a biblical text about ivory palaces. Goodbye Procter & Gamble White Soap. Hello Ivory. More recently, Tom Peters published *A Brand Called You*. And Tony Blair tried to re-brand the UK as "Cool Britannia."

A brand, in the fullest sense, is hard to define. Dictionary definitions tend to focus on the trademark aspect, and yes, branding does involve some sort of identifying mark. But this misses the point. What makes a brand valuable?

*The answer is The Advantage of Belief.*<sup>1</sup> Charles Revson of Revlon famously said, "In the factory we make cosmetics. In the store we sell hope." In other words, a brand is not a product; it's what people *believe* about a product. These beliefs can be immensely powerful. The most astonishing is the placebo effect. In clinical trials, many patients respond to the "sugar pill," even when they have serious diseases. We see the same thing with blind and identified product tests. With a strong brand, the preference jumps. (See *What's in a Name* by John Philip Jones.) And when the Advantage of Belief takes hold, it leads to a long list of benefits:

- |                                   |   |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| a) Customer loyalty               | e) Facilitating brand extensions              |
| b) Higher price                   | f) Withstanding competitive attack            |
| c) Higher cash flows              | g) Motivating staff and attracting new talent |
| d) Higher long-term profitability | h) Potentially augmenting the stock price     |

This doesn't, of course, answer the question, "how do you build these beliefs?" There are widely varying notions, but most people agree on the basic principles: (1) stake out what the brand can and should stand for (2) stick with this over time (3) evolve to account for lessons learned and market changes.<sup>2</sup>

This can't be done by empty promises. We have to assess what consumers want against what the product delivers—and tell the story better than competitors do. We have a melting pot of perceptions and reality to work with. All the "brand" ideas are there to help—Brand Image, Equity, Personality, Character, Essence, Relationship, Footprint, Truth, Soul, Identity, and so on—along with old faithfuls like Positioning, Focus of Sale, USP, Features, Attributes, Benefits and Values. Whatever the terminology, though, the brand has to stand for something relevant and different in the consumer's mind. See also *Crossover Note 26*.

<sup>1</sup> This is a phrase of mine, though the idea that a brand is "more" has been described by many authors.

<sup>2</sup> How do you do this? See *Excellence in Brand Communication*: [www.ica.adbeast.com](http://www.ica.adbeast.com)

- 2. Brand Truths.** Successful advertising (in fact all successful communication) resonates with its audience. As a marketer, you may want people to believe that you have the best-tasting coffee, but simply saying, “I have the best-tasting coffee” will not usually get the resonance you need. One school of thought believes in saying the obvious as loudly and even as crassly as you can. We could call it the Bad Boy syndrome. Another has led to the idea of Brand Truths. These operate on a deeper level than simple claims. One of the top UK agencies described the process as “we interrogate the product until it confesses its strength.”

I was once the Brand Manager on Tide, and when we were asked, “What does Tide stand for” we said, “Superior cleaning. Not whitening. Not Brightening. Not Fabric Care. Superior *cleaning*.”<sup>3</sup>

Superior cleaning was the religion on Tide, and Tide delivered, despite the cliché that all detergents are alike. But this was only a glimmer of the Brand Truth. If you “interrogated” Tide the most startling truth was the *intense belief* of Tide users. This came to life in the immensely successful “Two for One Swap” campaign. Hidden cameras watched as women who had just bought Tide were offered two boxes of another good detergent in exchange. They adamantly refused, delivering off-the-cuff endorsements that no copywriter could ever have written. The campaign ran for years, and only came to an end because of its success—women knew it so well that the “candid camera” interview became impossible. Many Brand Truths are also insights, and for a list see [11. The Eureka Insight](#) and [12. Changing the Goalposts](#).

- 16. When a campaign stumbles.** This might be a momentary stutter and (if we were clairvoyant) we would make whatever minor fix was needed. But it might be the first clue that something is going off the rails. In this situation, the pressure can lead to snap (and wrong) judgments. The best answer usually comes from a blend of experience, judgment, intuition, vision, and research. Here are some pointers.

1. **Dig deep into trends and tastes.** You could be on the wrong side of a tectonic shift. “Made in Japan” used to mean a cheap, shlocky, knock-off, and North American business took years to recognize the threat that was coming from Japan. Consider Listerine. The famous slogan “Always a bridesmaid, but never a bride” started life in a Listerine advertisement, reflecting a bad breath positioning that had been in place for as long as anyone can remember. But Listerine saw the shift towards the idea of a healthy mouth. (See Cassies 1995 and 2002). Something similar happened in toothpaste. At one time, Pepsodent (“you’ll wonder where the yellow went...”) was the leader, and whitening was the high ground. Then Crest came with fluoride (and dental association endorsement), and Pepsodent slid into history. Then, over a generation, cavities stopped being the problem they once were.<sup>4</sup> The market shifted towards “mouth health” and Colgate got there first with Colgate Total, knocking Crest off its #1 perch. Crest responded with Crest Complete—and now the whole market has come full circle with a furious battle for whitening again.

2. **Look at the goalposts.** If they really haven’t changed, then it’s likely that you

<sup>3</sup> P&G defined “what the brand stands for” by a document they called the Creative Strategy. In those days, if anyone dreamt that the Tide Creative Strategy should include whitening, brightening etc. it was seen as an offence against all that was holy. Since then, P&G has changed its views, and now takes a broader view—as recent Tide advertising for fabric care and Tide-with-Febreze attest.

<sup>4</sup> Ironically, Crest helped make this happen by virtue of its sustained “no cavities” marketing.

just have a short-term stutter. But if they have, try to envisage the new game. See *11. The Eureka Insight*, and *12. Changing the Goalposts*.

3. **Think through the change needed.** See *6. Should the product be improved?* and *14. Refreshing a Continuing Campaign*.
4. **Change for the right reasons.** It's broadly true that long-running campaigns—kept fresh and relevant—are great brand-builders. And it's sadly true that new people, wanting to make their mark, change things for change's sake. But once in a while, major change is needed. Molson Canadian (Cassies I) was a niche player when it launched "What Beer's all About" in the late 80s. This campaign helped turn Canadian into a mainstream beer, and it displaced Labatt Blue as market leader. They kept going with "What Beer's all About" for a few years. But they also stayed alert to the need for change, in particular watching the appeal ratings with the younger legal-age drinker. This led them to launch the "I AM" campaign (Cassies III). This was successful, but eventually it ran out of steam. They re-incarnated with "Joe's Rant" (Cassies 2001). But this, in the words of the 2006 Molson case, turned out to be a glorious one off as Molson—along with other mainstream brands—ran into the onslaught of the "24 for \$24" crowd.

Separately, though this time the need for change more obvious, Juicy Fruit (almost literally) destroyed its former squeaky clean image with the guitar-smashing campaign. (Cassies 2005.) And in Cassies 2007, Benylin realized that the "trooper" attitude in all its competitors could be challenged.

**23. Problem versus Solution.** There's a widespread idea that advertising works better when it is positive—reflecting a mental model that advertising should spend more time on the solution than the problem. But this can be challenged:

- Quebec's "Buckle Up" campaign in Cassies I.
- The campaign against Quebec's Medical Bill 120 in Cassies I.
- The Heart and Stroke campaign in Cassies I.
- Oxfam Canada in Cassies II.
- Buckley's in Cassies III.
- Dove Litmus in Cassies III. (Most of the commercial is showing harshness.)
- Big Brothers Vancouver and Ethical Funds in Cassies 99.
- Sunlight in Cassies 99. (Most of the commercial is spent on getting dirty.)
- Erectile Difficulties in Cassies 2002.
- SAAQ anti-speeding in Cassies 2002.
- Bait Cars in Cassies 2003.
- Familiprix in Cassies 2003.
- Motrin in Cassies 2003.
- Elections Ontario in Cassies 2004.
- The "Stupid" campaign in Cassies 2005. Also the United Way.
- Moores in Cassies 2005.
- SAAQ, Gay Lea and Avion in Cassies 2007.

Note: When I tell people that Dove Litmus and Sunlight "Get Dirty" spend most of their time on the problem they often disagree, until they re-look at the commercials.

This is why our thinking needs to be re-examined. The issue shouldn't be the *time* that a piece of advertising spends on this or that, but on the *net impression* created.

**28. Media Learning.** Many years ago, studies (mainly in packaged goods) led to the idea of “effective frequency.” It was based on two broad notions:

- a) That advertising (assuming the creative was effective) had its best effect after 2-3 exposures in a purchase cycle.
- b) That exposure beyond this led to diminishing returns.

This thinking matched the agreed learning theory i.e. that it takes repetition before a message sticks, but then boredom sets in, and repetition does not increase learning much, if at all.<sup>5</sup> This thinking has dominated media planning (particularly in TV) for years, and I think many planners still embrace it today, not necessarily knowing its origins. It has gone by names such as effective frequency and 3+ planning. The idea is to try to give the audience 2-3 exposures in a purchase cycle, without wasting excessive frequency on them.<sup>6</sup>

Other models also exist. There are “pulsing” models. There’s an “impact” model for making a big splash. And there are markets like beer, with heavy seasonal spending, and their own notions about the best way to schedule effort.

Then, in the mid 90s, John Philip Jones—formerly of JWT UK/Europe and for some time Professor of Communications at Syracuse University—published a study that seemed to say that *just one* TV exposure (in the week before purchase) was enough. See **13. Immediate vs. Long-Term Effect.**

This put the cat among the pigeons. Some have embraced the thinking. Some have attacked it. Jones’s findings were in harmony with those of Erwin Ephron (see the Pepsi paper in 2002) and the whole field has come to be called Recency Planning.

It proposes lower weekly weights than have historically been recommended, with longer weekly duration. TV Programmes are also selected to avoid high frequency on the same shows. This is drip-drip rather than impact, and it flies in the face of some long-held beliefs.

It seems to have worked for Pepsi, but detractors say that it has its failures too. For more on this controversial topic, the WARC website is invaluable—with papers by Jones, Lodish, and McDonald being a good place to start.

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<sup>5</sup> There are even findings that continued exposure *depresses* learning, though I find that hard to believe.

P&G built very strong brands on its soap operas, and those daytime viewers saw the same ads repeatedly.

<sup>6</sup> It has traditionally been hard to avoid the excess frequency, especially with heavy TV viewers.